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I find Professor Edley's perspective on the administrative process of
great interest.' Like him, I agree that there exist today various crises
both in administrative law and in the regulatory process. Notwithstand-
ing the eight years of the "Reagan Revolution," the administrative state
has not yet been tamed. Even a short list of our regulatory ills must
include such problems as inefficiencies in mass adjudication (which hurt
the ordinary citizen), bureaucratic paralysis (whether or not you accept
public choice theory), and structural rigidity (which fails to exploit mar-
ket incentives or use private sector opportunities where appropriate).
Professor Edley's list is, of course, much longer.2 He fails, however, to
distinguish between problems that stem from administrative structure
and process, and those that stem from the political arena.
The key to Edley's thinking is his classification of both administra-
tive law issues and decisions into what he calls a "trichotomy. ' ' 3 The
trichotomy attempts to apprehend and reconcile those factors of science,
politics, and adjudicatory fairness that are relevant to any administrative
law decision.4 Professor Edley suggests (correctly, I believe) that each of
the approaches to present-day agency decisionmaking-science, politics,
and adjudicatory fairness-utilizes separate decisional methodologies.5
Thus, if a problem is one of science, you use technical expertise; if poli-
tics, you look to interest accommodation or balancing; and if adjudica-
tory fairness, you use procedural due process. Put this way, Edley's
trichotomy offers a helpful explanatory framework to the rich texture of
administrative law. I find, however, that it provides little advice on fu-
ture decisionmaking and, to that extent, it is not heuristic.
* Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States. B.A., M.A., 1967, University
of Pennsylvania; B. Phil., 1970, Oriel College, Oxford University; J.D., 1973, University of
Pennsylvania.
1. See Edley, The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L..
561.
2. See id. at 564-65.
3. See id. at 568.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 568-69.
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In place of the all-encompassing trichotomy, Edley proposes an al-
ternative decisional methodology--"sound governance"-that requires
viewing the three paradigms as an integrated trio.6 Ultimately, Edley
wants the "project" of administrative law to "move away from its anach-
ronistic focus on discretion and face directly the problems of sound gov-
ernance."' 7 And sound governance, he tells us, is a job not only of
agencies but of courts. Indeed, in his book, he writes: "[M]y argument is
that the proper judicial motivation is sound governance and that sound
governance should be the engine of judicial innovation and action."8
It is clearly hard to oppose a concept such as sound governance, but
I find that as a heuristic device it is not helpful. In fact, I suspect that
Edley's sound governance theory is in some respects a metaphor for that
dreaded thing-judicial activism. Perhaps Edley believes that by cutting
the constraints of separation of powers, law and politics will become one:
the trichotomy will collapse into itself, with the judiciary assuming ulti-
mate authority.9 In this, Edley assumes that federal judges would be
better guardians of public policy than, for example, the Commissioners
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). My objection to this contention is the
same as Judge Wald's: It is not judges' work to invite a "'dialogue' be-
tween courts and agencies on the norms of sound governance."' 0 As
Chevron correctly points out, "[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wis-
dom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest are not judicial ones... ." 11 Thus, "policy
arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators,
not to judges."12 That work is better suited for think tank organizations,
such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, or
the Heritage Foundation. Indeed, I would argue that Edley's version of
administrative law is not law, but rather politics; he attempts to pull back
into the law school what has been slipping away to the Kennedy School.
His trichotomy is the project of public policy, not of administrative law.
As a matter of political theory, I find it difficult to understand why
Edley assigns the sound governance project to the judicial "pew" rather
than to the pew of politics and public policy. Although many of the
6. See C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAU-
CRACY 213 (1990).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 129.
9. Yes, he truly suggests this. See Edley, supra note 1, at 582.
10. Wald, The "New Administrative Law"--With the Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 DUKE L.J.
647, 648.
11. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984).
12. Id. at 866.
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questions that Edley asks of the sound governance project are legitimate,
they are questions for students of public policy, political science, and leg-
islatures, not for courts. It is the job of Congress to wrestle with the
relationships between the three legs of the tripod. It is Congress, acting
within the context of the Constitution, that directs judges as to when a
particular paradigm should be utilized.13 As Vermont Yankee 14 points
out, it is in one sense Congress's job to say when it wants to ensure addi-
tional procedural "fairness" through the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).1 5 And it is Congress's job to say when it wants agencies to incor-
porate policy (Edley would say political) considerations in their decision-
making process. 16
Like it or not, judges are not trained either in policy analysis or in
scientific truth-seeking. Indeed, in a recent review of Edley's book, Tom
Sargentich suggests that agency fact-finding receives a high degree of def-
erence from courts on the grounds that such findings result from a
method of reasoning distinct from that to which courts are accustomed.' 7
(Perhaps the appropriate word should be "qualified" rather than "accus-
tomed.") Lack of competence may not be an institutional characteristic
in the hallowed halls of Harvard, but the question of institutional compe-
tence ought not be ignored in considering the nature and limits of judicial
review of agency action.
Although Edley's obsession with the judiciary as the key to sound
governance is questionable, I do not mean to imply that the judiciary
cannot make positive contributions to the sound governance project.
Congress has often failed in its responsibility by writing ambiguous and
inconsistent statutes forged in the political to and fro of the legislative
process. Indeed, the ambiguity is not always inadvertent, but sometimes
actually intentional. The sad fact is that Congress often accepts innu-
merable linguistic ambiguities to get a piece of legislation passed, and
then leaves it to the courts to decipher its meaning.
13. See Williams, The Roots of Deference (Book Review), 100 YALE L.J. 1103, 1108 (1991)
(reviewing C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAU-
CRACY (1990)) ("Edley, though emphatic (and correct) that agency decisions draw on three of his
modes of reasoning, disregards the agency and party choices that typically make one mode pivotal in
court. The effect is to impute to courts rather fanciful opportunities to choose among modes and
thus degrees of deference.").
14. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 546 (1978).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372 (1988).
16. Id. at 557.
17. See Sargentich, The Future ofAdministrative Law (Book Review), 104 HARV. L. REV. 769,
776 (1991) (reviewing C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY (1990)).
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If Congress were more disciplined in the making of statutes, the
pressure on the judiciary to engage in an overweening activism would
significantly diminish. I humbly suggest that if judges find the statutory
language incoherent, they might say so. Indeed, they might even say that
"we can't decide this because it is incoherent." I think such actions
would spur Congress to go back and see how to improve the statute.
Rather than seek out less and less credible legislative history to aid in
statutory interpretation, courts might state: "Look, we are going to hold
off the final opinion for six months to see if Congress clarifies, by statute,
what it meant." This does not mean that judges should refuse to apply a
statute. By stating that a statute is inexplicable, however, Congress's at-
tention will focus on the need for more careful drafting and a more ac-
countable legislative process.
Implementation of this kind of "appropriate" judicial activity can be
seen in the efforts of Robert Katzmann, in concert with the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to create better
judicial-congressional interaction."' Katzmann has set up an informal
arrangement with the Circuit by which the court sends to the Govern-
ance Institute cases that criticize statutes as utterly confusing or indeci-
pherable. The Institute then collates these opinions and sends them to
relevant House and Senate Committees. After a year in operation, the
results of this process indicate that the concept is worth exploring, and
perhaps ought to be institutionalized in some official government body-
be it the Judicial Conference, a congressional committee, or the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States.' 9
One problem with Edley's strategy is his extremely dense, and at
times impenetrable, language. For example, take the following con-
18. See Katzmann, The Continuing Challenge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD IN-
sTrruTIONAL COMITY 185-89 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988) [hereinafter Katzmann, The Continuing
Challenge]. Katzmann appreciates the sensitivity of judges to the separation of powers doctrine and
to other legal concerns. However, the Constitution does not prohibit communication between the
branches. See Katzmann, Building Bridges: Courts, Congress, & Guidelines for Communications,
BROOKINGS REv., Spring 1991, at 42, 43 ("Beyond prohibiting the court from issuing advisory
opinions, the Constitution itself offers few clues about the character of relations between Congress
and the courts."). As stated by Congressman Robert Kastenmeier:
A radical restructuring of the relationship between the branches is not necessary, but each
branch should give priority to institutional reforms. If the judiciary and the Congress are
to interact intelligently, each has to understand the activities of the other. And, by neces-
sity, this understanding must incorporate improved channels of communication which con-
tribute to rational decision making and to reasoned listening.
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 92 (1990).
19. See Katzmann, The Continuing Challenge, supra note 18, at 185-87; see also Remarks of
Robert A. Katzmann before the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, 124 F.R.D. 241, 322-26 (1988);
Coffin, The Federalist Number 86: On Relations between the Judiciary and Congress, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY, supra note 18, at 21.
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clusory statement found in his book, Administrative Law: "[T]he post-
trichotomy model of law would transmute the deathless discretion per-
mitted and generated by the present doctrinal structure into a different
form of discretion, centered on the evolution and application of norms
directly tied to a modernist objective."' 20 Fortunately, Edley later re-
states his vision of the future: "The central aspect of this evolutionary
image is partnership. The court joins the agency and the legislature to
confront directly the problems of governance in a complicated and un-
certain world."'21
When the APA was passed in 1946, it was intended to place a
"floor" on some elements of procedural fairness under federal agency
processes, while preserving the essential benefits of administrative ac-
tion-speed, low cost, informality, and agency expertise. Over the years,
these processes have taken on increasing formality, complexity, and,
often, rigidity. Although traditional administrative procedures are cer-
tainly fair (and perceived as such), they can be expensive and time-con-
suming. Delay is often the rule rather than the exception. The high cost
of participation in the administrative process or court review can freeze
out smaller, less affluent interests. Formality also tends to place a pre-
mium on procedural expertise. Citizens who may be quite effective when
informally attempting to persuade their colleagues or friends of the just-
ness of their cause can become reticent when placed in a forum that
forces them to present their views within procedural constraints designed
for law school graduates. With the passage of the Administrative Dis-
pute Resolution Act of 199022 and its companion Negotiated Rulemak-
ing Act of 1990,23 we see a renewed congressional emphasis on restoring
those important benefits while adding a somewhat new dimension-an
enhanced participation by private parties in the actual decisionmaking of
the government. 24
20. C. EDLEY, supra note 6, at 263.
21. Id. at 264.
22. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 9
U.S.C.).
23. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590).
24. Both the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act are
based on numerous recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS). See, eg., Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation No. 82-4),
1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1991); Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation
No. 85-5), 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1991); Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution
(Recommendation No. 86-3), 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1991); Assuring the Fairness and Acceptability of
Arbitration in Federal Programs (Recommendation No. 87-5), 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-5 (1991). See gen-
erally ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY
USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DIsPUTE RESOLUTION (1987); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCEBOOK: NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING (1990).
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Clearly, Edley believes that contemporary administrative law is
hung up on an "antidiscretion project," that is to say, the effort to make
the administrative state "safe for liberty and palatable to democracy only
when constraints are imposed on administrative discretion through
judge-made law and congressionally enacted procedural safeguards." 25
Edley also believes that the purpose of constraining administrative dis-
cretion is to protect "the legitimacy of blurred institutional roles." 26
This is a conceptual mistake. The constraint of discretion does not de-
pend on "murky separation-of-powers constructs."'27 Indeed, the two
have nothing to do with each other. The effort to constrain administra-
tive discretion flows from traditional concerns for asserting the rule of
law. It is the reason why the magisterial A.V. Dicey claimed there could
be no administrative law in England, because administrative law ran
counter to judicial supremacy and the rule of law.28 The less formality,
the greater the administrative flexibility, and the greater the danger of
agency impropriety-or so the real anti-discretion project goes.
The key to discussing discretion is to analyze which areas of discre-
tion are licit and which are illicit. Consider, for example, the problem of
grant procedures. The question of how government grants should be dis-
tributed underscores the extent to which administrative law is not neces-
sarily a matter of technocratic expertise, but of political choices-and
that such choices can be licit.
Edley's trichotomy correctly notes that there is science, and there is
politics. 29 The challenge is how to integrate politics into administration,
and not, as Edley suggests, to politicize the courts.30 The key is bureau-
cratic accountability. Courts play a role, but ultimately elected offi-
cials-whether in the legislative or executive branch-should be held
accountable because they are elected by the people. The trichotomy, of
course, covers the waterfront. And I am certain that the efforts to inte-
grate politics and administration, like many others, can be accommo-
dated within it. It is, I believe, where the action is and should be in
administrative law.31
25. Edley, supra note 1, at 566.
26. C. EDLEY, supra note 6, at 215.
27. Id.
28. A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 267-69
(1959) ("IT]he attempt made by the Crown ... to form a strong central administration... was at
bottom repugnant to the manners and traditions of the country.... [Tihe exercise of discretionary
power by the Crown was inconsistent with our system of administration and the ideas of English
law.").
29. See Edley, supra note 1, at 568-69.
30. See id. at 601.
31. Thus, one might question the proper reading ofRutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S. Ct.
2729 (1990) (holding that conditioning hiring decisions on political belief and association violates
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Ectley also criticizes Chevron for placing abstract constraints on the
role of courts.32 Chevron's deference requirement is perhaps what agi-
tates Edley most about administrative law. For under Chevron, courts
engage in deference, not due to a theory of presumed agency expertise,
but because of "separation of powers" and democratic accountability
considerations. Chevron teaches us that courts should defer to adminis-
trative agencies in the case of statutory ambiguity because statutory anal-
ysis is less of a scientific process than the explication of a range of
legitimate meanings, each representing different policy options. In such
circumstances, in Judge Laurence Silberman's words, "agencies-even
the independent ones-have superior political standing to the life-ten-
ured federal judiciary in performing that policymaking function. '33
Agencies, unlike judges, have a more direct relationship with the demo-
cratic process. They are part of the executive branch that, whatever its
faults, holds the institutional processes to reflect popular will.
Nevertheless, I must say to Edley, "don't knock the 'antidiscretion'
project," or (following Kenneth Culp Davis) what I would more fairly
call the "structured discretion" project.34 It has served freedom well. As
one watches with some awe the flood tide of freedom spill over into East-
ern Europe, one is struck by the efforts of lawyers in those countries to
recreate western notions of holding officials accountable to the rule of
law. Indeed, even the Soviet Union has endeavored to include judicial
review of administrative agency conduct in its new package of legal re-
forms.35 This notion that every man is subject to the law, that the "hum-
blest is the peer of the most powerful,"'36 is central to the antidiscretion
project. The critical legal thinkers may disparage it, but in the real world
applicants' first amendment rights in absence of a vital governmental interest), and the meaning of
the Three Sisters Bridge litigation, see District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 434
F.2d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating that a legislature "may not constitutionally disenfranchise a
group of citizens because of their expected views"). Further, one might explore the kinds of ques-
tions to be asked when agencies change their minds for political reasons. See, eg., Automobile
Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (deferring to the NLRB's
statutory interpretation used in the agency's decision to reverse precedent and replace the "pattern
of conduct" cases with a new rule); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983) (overturning an agency's rescission of an automobile passive-restraints rule
while permitting the agency to provide a record for the change in policy).
32. See C. EDLEY, supra note 6, at 66, 120, 261. Indeed, Edley refers to the case as "infa-
mous." See Edley, supra note 1, at 573.
33. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 821, 823
(1990).
34. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 97-99 (1977).
35. Of course, nothing has yet been implemented. For a collection of essays concerning the
status of administrative law in the Soviet Union, see SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THEORY AND
POLICY (G. Ginsburgs ed. 1989).
36. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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most would prefer to live in a society "planted thick with laws" 37 rather
than try to "stand upright in the winds that would blow" 38 without the
protective thicket proffered by the rule of law. 39
II. REGARDING SUNSTEIN
Professor Sunstein proposes that the next generation of administra-
tive law scholarship shift its focus from its "traditional preoccupation
with the judiciary to a focus on congressional and bureaucratic
processes[, which] remain ill-understood despite the fact that they have
far more important roles in government regulation." 40 In Sunstein's
view, regulation can benefit from "strategies that will incorporate an un-
derstanding of market forces, promote the democratic character of mod-
em government, and increase international competitiveness while
minimizing undesirable side-effects and reducing regulatory costs."'41 I
agree with Sunstein that we must shift our attention away from courts
and toward different audiences, such as Congress, administrators, and
the public. Instead of concentrating on judicial review as an external
constraint on administrative discretion, we must examine regulatory fail-
ures of the past to develop policies and processes that will avoid such
failures in the future.
Where I differ, however, is that I believe Sunstein's "substance pro-
ject" can only be successfully addressed by examining the "especially
pervasive and often overlooked problem" of administrative structure.42
In studying issues of structure and process (I consider structure and pro-
cess as opposite sides of the same coin), judicial review is but one ap-
proach. Thus, Sunstein's view of procedure should be seen as a critique
37. R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, act I, at 39 (1960).
38. Id.
39. "Left wing" critics of legal structure have praised the role played by the rule of law in
society. As E.P. Thompson, the well-known historian and social critic, has pointed out:
[There is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law. We ought to expose
the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath [the] law. But the rule of law
itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defense of the citizen from
power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good.
E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975). Not surpris-
ingly, Thompson's support of this bourgeoisie virtue failed to find favor with many of his "left wing"
colleagues. See, eg., B. FINE, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBERAL IDEAS AND MARX-
1sT CRITIQUES 169-89 (1984); Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good? (Book
Review), 86 YALE L.J. 561, 565-66 (1977) (reviewing D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. RULE, E. THOMP-
SON & C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND (1975)).
40. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 642.
41. Id. at 610. Although Professor Sunstein encourages reform in the area of "social" regula-
tion, I would venture to say that by his inclusion of discrimination within this category, he implies
that "economic" regulation can benefit as well. See id. at 609.
42. Id. at 627.
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of the American penchant to equate administrative law with judicial re-
view (an opinion I share).
At the Administrative Conference, we broadly interpret our man-
date to "study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative
procedure used by administrative agencies .. . . 43 Our commitment
goes beyond judicial review, and focuses on issues of structure and pro-
cess that lead to the improvement of administrative law. Thus, at the
risk of sounding parochial, I would urge that Professor Sunstein supple-
ment his call for reform of administrative substance with what I would
label (perhaps facetiously) the process project.44 This "process project"
should focus on problems of governance (hopefully "sound") that have
little or nothing to do with courts. On my own short list of study areas I
would include the following:
1. Congressional Micro-Management
By this I mean the post-Chadha45 experience on Congressional
oversight of the regulatory process, and whether it has fostered a more
effective administration. 46 This includes the use of appropriations riders,
the oversight hearing, the confirmation process, and other forms of in-
volvement in regulatory process.
2. Keating Five Redux 47
By this I mean the proper response of agencies to congressional in-
quiries/pressure that inevitably leads to an examination of the role of
individual members of Congress representing their constituencies' inter-
ests. 48 One example is Senator Robert Dole's (R-Kan.) recent introduc-
43. Administrative Conference Act of 1964, 5 U.S.C. §§ 574 (1988).
44. Cf Sunstein, supra note 40, at 631.
45. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative veto contrary to separation of
powers doctrine).
46. See C. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE
CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1988) (analyzing what legislative oversight of agencies' regu-
latory programs has actually accomplished).
47. Over a two-month period starting on November 15, 1990, five United States Senators,
dubbed the "Keating Five," were investigated by the Senate Select Committee on Ethics regarding
whether large campaign contributions they received from Charles H. Keating, Jr., president of the
failed Lincoln Savings and Loan, prompted them to intervene with regulators on Keating's behalf.
The senators were Alan Cranston (D-Cal.); Dennis De Concini (D-Ariz.); Donald Riegle, Jr. (D-
Mich.); John Glenn (D-Ohio); and John McCain (R-Ariz.). See Editorial, The Keating Five Three
One, Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 4, 1991, at 20, col. 3; Mayer, The Keating Five Adds Up to Just
Two, Newsday, Feb. 8, 1991, at 61, col. 1.
48. This is the classic debate over the role of the representative. The Madisonian view suggests
that elected officials ought to act as "trustees" of the public interest (if that is definable) "refin[ing]
and enlarg[ing] the public views" to "discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." THE
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tion of legislation that requires public disclosure of congressional
inquiries regarding (among other things) ongoing enforcement actions.49
3. The Role of Federalism
By this I mean how programs with the need for federal standards
operate in the context of local solutions. Questions of federal preemption
in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 50 bank
regulation, 51 and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)52 become
relevant as is the role of block grants and other decentralized forms of
grant management. 53
4. Non-traditional Forms of Bureaucratic Accountability
By this I mean the development of citizen safeguards as
ombudsman, 54 inspectors general, 55 institutionalization of whistleblower
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (J. Madison). John Adams's competing view was that a representative
legislature "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel,
reason and act like them .. " 4 J. ADAMS, Letter to John Penn, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
205 (1850). See generally H. PrrIKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
49. See The Comprehensive Campaign Finance Reform and Ethics Act of 1991, S. 6, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 201, 137 CONG. REc. S503, S504 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991).
50. See Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecu-
tions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REv. 535 (1987).
51. See Kreissman, Administrative Preemption in Consumer Banking Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 911
(1987).
52. See Comment, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a Common
Law Criminal, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 311 (1990). See generally Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism:
The Missing Link 16 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 69, 69 (1988) (warning that the federal preemption
doctrine threatens to become "the new Lochner").
53. See L. BROWN, J. FOSS=rr & K. PALMER, THE CHANGING POLITICS OF FEDERAL
GRANTS 147-52 (1984).
54. See D. ANDERSON & D. STOCKTON, OMBUDSMEN IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: THE THEORY
AND THE PRACTICE (1990) (report for ACUS); Frank, The Ombudsman-A Challenge, INT'L BAR
J., Nov. 1971, at 32. Some federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, the Army
Materiel Command, and the Food and Drug Administration, have ombudsmen. See The
Ombudsman in Federal Agencies (Recommendation No. 90-2), 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2 (1991).
55. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (1988).
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qui tam actions5 6 or whistleblower protection statutes,57 and the use of
private attorneys general.5 8
5. A Coordinated Regulatory Policy
By this I mean the role of the Office of Management and Budget
review system,5 9 its comparison to state regulatory review programs in
such states as Arizona6° and California, 61 the role of the Council on En-
vironmental Quality (CEQ), the roles of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions (ACIR), and other coordinating bodies.
6. Cost Efficiency in Regulation
By this I mean the use of cost-benefit analysis in decisionmaking, 62 a
reinstitution of de minimis exceptions as a rule of interpretation in regu-
56. False Claims Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988)). These amendments substantially broaden the opportunities for qui
tam actions-when a private individual, acting on behalf of and in the name of the United States,
sues those who submit false claims for payment of government funds. If successful, these private
attorneys general are entitled to up to 25% of the awarded damages. See generally United States ex
rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that
qui tam actions do not violate separation of powers even though prosecutorial functions are dele-
gated to private parties); United States ex reL Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, 714 F. Supp. 1084
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act do not violate separation
of powers or appointment clause). See also Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99
YALE L.J. 341 (1989); Vogel, Citizens' Lawsuits Based on the False Claims Act Have Multiplied,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 20, 32-34.
57. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (giving enhanced authority and responsibility to the Office
of Special Counsel to protect whistleblowers and other employees victimized by prohibited personnel
practices, and providing whistleblowers with an independent right to take cases before the Merit
Systems Protection Board).
58. For a discussion of EPA's experience with private attorneys general, see Coordination of
Public and Private Enforcement of Environmental Laws (Recommendation No. 85-3), 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.85-3 (1991); Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assess-
ment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. 833 (1986).
59. Substantive regulatory review is conducted by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), a division of OMB, which was created in 1980 pursuant to the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 3503, 94 Stat. 2812, 2814 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3503-
3520 (1988)).
60. See, eg., Falk, State Regulatory Development and Reform: An Overview, 1985 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 261; Rose, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking in Arizona: The Governor's Regulatory Review
Council-The First Three Years, 1985 ARIz. ST. L.J. 425.
61. See M. PRICE, EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF RULEMAKING: THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW IN CALIFORNIA (1981) (report for ACUS).
62. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982) (requiring executive branch. agencies, in
the context of certain "major rules," to observe, unless precluded by law, specified cost-benefit for-
mulae when regulating and issuing initial and final Regulatory Impact Analyses).
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latory law, and a focus on how to provide process in agency adjudication
with a sensitivity to cost considerations.
Thus, there exist numerous areas of process and structure that do
not involve issues of judicial review. Although I believe that a focus on
substance as the future goal for administrative law is valuable, it requires
that we study coextensive structures that better effectuate our substantive
goals.
Americans tend to accept the given as set in stone. In fact, regula-
tory structures that can be used to solve a regulatory problem abound.
The New Deal saw the growth of multi-member independent regulatory
agencies. More recently, the impetus for multi-member commissions has
flagged.63 The current trend is to establish separate independent agencies
with a single head. For example, Congress has considered transforming
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission into a single-member agency 64 and
bringing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission within the execu-
tive branch with a single commissioner. 65 Additionally, the Office of
Government Ethics was emancipated from the Office of Personnel Man-
agement, to provide it with some perceived measure of autonomy. 66 A
new preference has emerged toward elevating an agency's stature to cabi-
net status, as seen most recently with the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs.67 A similar effort is underway for the EPA. 68
63. But see Social Security as an Independent Agency Act, H.R. 791, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (a bill to remove the Social Security Administration from the Department of Health and
Human Services and establish it as an independent agency headed by a three-member bipartisan
board).
64. During the 100th Congress, the Senate passed S. 2443, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG.
Rc. SI 1,049-01 (1988), which proposed to replace the five-member Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion with a single administrator. At the time, the House declined to go along with the plan. In the
next Congress, the proposal was re-introduced but not enacted. See Nuclear Regulation Reorgani-
zation Reform Act of 1989, S. 946, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG REC. S5427 (daily ed. May 16,
1989).
65. The Bush Administration made this proposal last year in the National Energy Strategy
package. See S. 570, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 52775 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991); H.R.
1301, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Senate Energy Committee has rejected the proposal; the
House has not yet acted.
66. Act Reauthorizing Office of Government Ethics, Pub. L. No. 100-598, 102 Stat. 3031
(1988) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-408 (1988)).
67. Department of Veterans Affairs Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988) (codified at
38 U.S.C. § 201 note (1988)). Admittedly, this movement is counterintuitive in that cabinet status
may be seen as highlighting an agency's nexus with the Executive.
68. On June 13, 1991, a bill to elevate the EPA to cabinet status, S. 533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REc. S14,028-32 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1991), was reported out of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee. See S. REP. No. 82, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A similar bill failed in the last
Congress. S. 2006, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S122-26 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990).
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At the same time, Congress has added to the administrative bestiary
new regulatory structures reminiscent of the British "quango." 69 These
include government-sponsored enterprises, public corporations, commis-
sions, and boards and authorities-all with different responsibilities and
different organizational structures. For example, the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),70 cre-
ated the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), giving it primary
responsibility for handling cases involving former FSLIC-insured institu-
tions that had been or would be placed in conservatorship or receiver-
ship. By statute, the RTC is governed by the FDIC Board of
Directors.71 However, Congress created an additional five-member over-
sight board composed of the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, the Chairman of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, and two members from outside the
government nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.72
Some members of Congress have proposed to reformulate the board so
that majority control is in the hands of individuals with no other govern-
mental duties. One proposal would reconstitute the RTC board to in-
clude nine members.73 Another would establish a single board of seven
voting members.74 Each of these structural formulations has its advan-
tages and disadvantages. The point, for our purposes, is that "structure
has consequences"-consequences regarding efficiency, fairness, and
democratic accountability. The effect of structure on each of these values
must be weighed in the balance.
In that regard, we must remind ourselves that such "delicately bal-
anced and innovative institutions" 75 must not distend the central princi-
69. "Quango" is British slang for "Quasi-Autonomous National Governmental Organization."
See Barnes, The Failure of Privatization, NAT'L REv., July 18, 1986, at 38; FCA Cottons to
"Quango," L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at D1, col. 1; Garrett, Goodbye to Quangos, Welcome to
Pingos," The Whitehall Revolution, Financial Times, Aug. 16, 1990, at 15, col. 6.
70. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501, 103 Stat. 183, 363 (1989) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a).
71. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(8)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
72. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(a) (West Supp. 1991).
73. See Resolution Trust Corporation Reorganization Act of 1991, S. 389, 102d Cong. 1st
Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S1795 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1991). The board would consist of three current
government members, the Chairman of the FDIC, and five members from the private sector ap-
pointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation. One of the private sector appointees would
serve as the full-time Chairperson.
74. See Loan Simplification Act, S. 572, 102d Cong, 1st Sess. (1991). In addition to the three
FDIC board members who would continue to serve (the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
would leave the current board and the Comptroller of the Currency would become a non-voting
member of the new board), the bill would add four full-time members subject to presidential appoint-
ment and Senate confirmation. One of the full-time members would serve as the Chairperson.
75. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metropolitan Washington Airports
Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva, J., dissenting), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
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pal of the unitary executive. At its root is not only a constitutional
doctrine "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 76 but a
democratic principle: if "the buck stops here," the person who carries
the buck must be able to hold bureaucrats accountable. Not all "innova-
tive.. . governmental experiment[s]" 77 in structure will encroach upon
the separation of powers principle, but they must first be analyzed from
that constitutional perspective.
Nonetheless, I certainly agree with Professor Sunstein's call for the
reform of administrative structures motivated by a "strong presumption
in favor of flexible, market-oriented, incentive-based regulatory strate-
gies." '78 Professor Sunstein attributes many of the regulatory failures in
the United States to "the use of rigid, highly bureaucratized 'command-
and-control' regulation. ' 79 He proposes the implementation of perform-
ance standards, which I understand to mean "standards that prescribe
the regulatory result to be achieved." 80 Their advantage includes leaving
regulated entities free to choose or invent "least cost solutions."81 They
foster innovation, produce more flexible results-oriented policy, and are
less damaging to competition in the free market. An example is the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, which adopted a performance stan-
dard requiring a "sharp points" laboratory test for toys and toy parts.82
This was an easier standard to write and certainly more cost effective
than trying to specify myriad design and material options acceptable for
toys. 83
Performance standards, however, can sometimes be harder to write,
harder to administer (both practically and as a matter of legal process),
and may provide competitive advantages for larger and more sophisti-
cated firms.84 Thus, when OSHA changed its fire safety rule dictating
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
77. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 917 F.2d at 61.
78. Sunstein, supra note 40, at 633.
79. Id. at 627.
80. Regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Recommendation No.
87-10), 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-10 (1991).
81. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PERFORMANCE STAN-
DARDS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AS A REGULATORY
ALTERNATIVE (1981); Haas, More Bang for the S, NAT'L J., Apr. 20, 1991, at 929.
82. See 16 C.F.R. § 1500.48 (1991).
83. Conversely, sanitary plumbing is subject to strict federal guidelines regulating construction
and safety standards. See 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603 (1991).
84. The Administrative Conference encouraged OSHA's use of performance standards when-
ever they would provide equivalent protection to that provided by design standards. See supra note
81. The recommendation, however, emphasized that the choice of regulatory technique must con-
sider whether the standard could be readily understood and monitored and whether it would, in fact,
lower compliance costs. See also Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives
and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 37-38 (1989).
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the exact height for mounting fire extinguishers and substituted a per-
formance standard stating that the extinguishers must be "accessible,"8 5
some in the industry complained that the burden of compliance became
more difficult.8 6 Notwithstanding this sort of problem, the federal gov-
ernment has only begun to use performance standards effectively. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an agency that has hewed rig-
idly to command-and-control regulation, is just beginning to re-examine
the use of performance standards. 87 Such efforts are positive and should
be encouraged.88
In addition to performance standards, we must examine the extent
to which self-certification works. Consider the Export Administration
Act, under which many transaction approvals are completely delegated
to exporters. 89 If the checking is performed properly, they can self-cer-
tify wholesale. However, if the exporters make even one mistake, then
individual validating licenses are required in which every item must be
sent before the regulatory agency to certify that the item will not be im-
properly distributed or used.90 This is an example of how one can couple
corporate self-interest with self-certification to accomplish significant
regulatory goals.91
In that regard I would applaud Sunstein's recognition of the value of
risk disclosure as a regulatory device. As Sunstein remarked at the sym-
posium, it provides an incentive to industry to improve so that they do
85. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.157(c) (1990).
86. See, e.g., Rader, Smotherman & Ehike, How to Handle an OSHA Case: An Employer's
Rights and Options, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 493, 494 (1981).
87. On October 30, 1990, I discussed the use of performance standards before the NRC, which,
since Three Mile Island, has strongly adhered to a command-and-control strategy for regulating
nuclear power plants. The Commission's argument against returning to performance standards is
that, in the context of nuclear regulation, you need bright-line rules to indicate whether the industry
is violating the law.
88. See Federal Program Performance Standards and Goals Act of 1991, S. 20, 102d Cong., Ist
Sess., 137 CONG. Rc. S623 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (requiring the development of performance
goals for all federal programs to be incorporated in the budget, and requiring the annual filing of
reports of actual performance as compared to these goals).
89. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988). The Act expired on September 30, 1990. How-
ever, the export controls program continues in effect by an Executive Order issued under authority
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1988). See Exec. Order
12,730, 3 C.F.R. § 305 (1990), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West 1991). Legislation to
extend and amend the Act was passed by Congress in 1990 but vetoed by the President. A similar
measure was reintroduced in 1991, see Export Administration Reauthorization Act of 1991, S. 320,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), and has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee and the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. 137 CONG. REC. Sl160 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1991).
90. See H. FENTON, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INJECTING NEEDED OPENNESS AND DUE PRO-
CESS REFORMS INTO UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS PROCEDURES (1991) (report for ACUS).
91. See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 620 (stating that regulation does not always override indi-
vidual goals: "[G]overnmental coordination of private behavior structures and organizes private
choices, and should not be seen as rejecting them.").
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not appear at the bottom of published risk lists.92 Further, the focus on
risk information disclosure treats the "object" of a regulation, be it the
consumer, employee, or citizen, as a participant in the regulatory pro-
cess, responsible for receiving facts and weighing the risks. 93
The litigation "explosion" and resulting crisis of "mass justice" have
led to the consideration of new structures of administrative adjudication
(this, frankly, is the area in which the average citizen is most likely to
"experience" administrative law). One example is the lay tribunal, often
used in British administrative procedure, which focuses less on precedent
and procedural formality and more on the substantive results, with a
concomitant restriction of judicial review of fact.94 Indeed we need to
consider whether there are ways to improve front-end procedures in ar-
eas like asylum adjudication 95 or social security disability processes96 and
then provide fewer bites at the apple at the back-end of the process.97
Furthermore, we need to consider where and how proceduralism
stands in the way of reform. For example, there is often a failure to
examine whether a situation demands emergency fast-track regulatory
action.98 We must question our assumptions regarding administrative
process and procedure, in spite of the fact that the "rights" revolution
caused many to equate more and more procedure with due process fair-
ness. It is hoped that with the passage of the Administrative Dispute
92. Imagine how bank lending practices would improve if the disclosure of bank risk ratios
were required.
93. One should not underestimate Sunstein's point that to "require industries to disclose the
existence of risks to the public until a regulation has been issued that establishes that the risks are
insignificant" will likely cause industry to press for more stringent safety regulations. Sunstein,
supra note 41, at 632. I am not certain, however, if such disclosure is in itselfa sufficient regulatory
device.
94. JUSTICE-ALL SOULS REVIEW COMMITrEE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: SOME NECES-
SARY REFORMS 212 (1988) (reviewing the British lay tribunal procedure).
95. See Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1247 (1990).
96. See The Disability Appeals Process Reform Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 1799 Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Ways and Means Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(testimony of Marshall J. Breger).
97. Recent studies of mass entitlement programs have urged the notion of "bureaucratic jus-
tice," arguing that case-load pressures make it necessary to reconceptualize the meaning of due
process. See J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 22, 34-40 (1983) (evaluating the structure and management of the Social Security disability
program); Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the
Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 199 (1990).
98. This question arose with the FDA's handling of applications relating to AIDS therapies.
See Foreman, The Fast Track- Federal Agencies and the Political Demand for AIDS Drugs, BROOK-
INGS REv., Spring 1991, at 30; cf In re Barr Laboratories, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(denying mandamus based on Food and Drug Administration's failure to act on generic drug appli-
cations within statutory deadline where result would impose offsetting burden on other applicants).
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Resolution Act 99 and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act1°° agencies will
take advantage of new mechanisms of administrative process. Indeed,
recalling the raison d'etre of the administrative state, we may yet be
forced to question whether proceduralism may at times impair both fair-
ness and efficiency.
I will only briefly mention Professor Sunstein's famous statutory
"canons." 101 I believe statutory interpretation has been over-analyzed in
recent years.102 Although the subject may yet provide grist for the mill
of the literary theorist (but I doubt it), it has become far too esoteric for
the practicing lawyer and, dare I say, the real-life judge. Except for his
discussion of regulatory rationales, Sunstein's Article excises that aspect
from his analysis of the regulatory state. My criticism is that Sunstein
would not merely read statutes in derogation of the common law, but
also to effectuate a host of subjective goals, such as civil rights and envi-
ronmental values, which are bound up in his understanding of civic vir-
tue. Suffice it to say that Professor Sunstein, like Professor Edley, would
require a degree of judicial activism which is rarely practiced, even by its
surviving devotees.
My final comments concern Sunstein's support for neo-Republican-
ism. 10 3 Everybody seems to want to be a neo-Republican.104 It is hard to
be against a notion that embraces civic virtue. The true meaning of the
term emphasizes an individual's role in society as a savior; focusing on
people who engage in the public sphere and in the public space as citizens
of a republic rather than as individuals engaging in private, selfish, pos-
sessive kinds of activity. Although there is much benefit in that ap-
proach, I must note that where virtue has reigned--Calvin's Geneva,105
99. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 9
U.S.C.).
100. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590).
101. See C. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 235-38 (1990).
102. See, eg., Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549
(1988); Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 1007 (1989); Faber,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281 (1989); Fallon, Of Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 916 (1988); Mikva, 4 Reply to
Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380; Shapiro & Glicksman, Congres The Supreme
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 819; Starr, Observations
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371; Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism
in the Interpretation of Statutes, 55 GEo. WASH. L. RV. (1988).
103. Defined by Edley as "the resurgence of interest in the possibility of civic virtue, public
deliberation, public-regarding behavior, and freedom as and through self-governance by individuals
and collectives." Edley, supra note 1, at 589.
104. Besides Professor Sunstein, other devotees include Jerry Frug and Mark Tushnet.
105. See W. BOUWSMA, JOHN CALVIN: A SIXTEENTH CENTURY PORTRAIT 204-13 (1988).
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Puritan Massachusetts,10 6 and maybe even Jacobin France' 0 7-the aca-
demic free spirit has not been in favor. There is an important place in
society for virtue, and it is necessary to emphasize the duty of participa-
tion, the duty of citizenship, and the duty of effectuating the public space.
However, the public duties alone have limitations. If you just focus on
the public space and altruist endeavor, you do not leave much for indi-
viduality to effectuate one's own personal and private domain.
I sometimes fear that there is a bit of Yuppie populism about civic
republican thought. The "haves" so often think of society as including
only people like themselves that they ignore the grass-roots participation
and volunteer activity going on in America today. There are many
lower-middle class communities with traditional values that emphasize
the helping hand in an enduring community structure. These people
often have the kind of values that are generally not going to get high
marks in the civic republican world view; they include evangelical reli-
gious communities. So although we have conditions for populism, we
will not necessarily be able to recreate them in the more rarified form of
civic republicanism. In the context of administrative law, civic republi-
canism falters by refusing to acknowledge the influence of structures and
processes-past, present and future-on the substance of political theory.
Thus, I would ask Professor Sunstein how he sees civic republicanism
specifically affecting the administrative state.108 I would say that it
means more federalism, greater public participation, expanded negoti-
ated rulemaking, and a sharper focus on ethics in the public service tradi-
tion, but I do not believe it can impact more than that. Thus, the value
of this analysis for administrative law in the twenty-first century remains
to be developed.
106. See G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 222-31 (1960) (ana-
lyzing the Puritans' emphasis on conformity and the attainment of religious and social practices at
the expense of individual personal liberty); R. PERRY, PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY 110 (1944)
(discussing how the Puritans used "consociation" to develop a centralized system of governance that
suppressed heresy and enforced external observances).
107. See C. BLUM, ROUSSEAU AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIRTUE: THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICS
IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 216-37 (1986).
108. Indeed, John Hart Ely goes further, suggesting that although a number of commentators
find "the republican tradition" of "significant intellectual interest," its "social and political assump-
tions seem substantially irrelevant to 20th century America." Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitu-
tional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts are No Different From Legislatures, 77 VA. L.
REV. 833, 840 n.15 (1991).
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